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ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: ARIZONA V. GANT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION
Jacob R. Brown
Abstract: In Arizona v. Gant,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest is permissible in only two situations: (1) when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment; or (2) when it is
reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the
vehicle. Because Gant expressed a standard more protective than that established by the
Washington State Supreme Court, Gant induced a state of confusion in Washington, where it
has long been maintained that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution offers
broader protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment. Since Gant, the Court
has twice attempted to redefine the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I,
section 7. In State v. Patton,2 and subsequently in State v. Valdez,3 the Washington State
Supreme Court adopted a standard closely resembling the first Gant prong. However, neither
decision expressly adopted or rejected the second. Because the second prong is supported by
historical Washington case law, the Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a
modified version of the Gant rule, with an added proscription on the opening of any locked
containers located during the search. Such a modification would satisfy the heightened
privacy protections of article I, section 7.

INTRODUCTION
For more than eighty years, Washington courts have struggled to
define the constitutionally authorized preconditions of the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest. Following a peripatetic path between the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, Washington
jurisprudence regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest reveals
little in the way of constancy or predictability.4 Never has this been more
1. 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
2. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009).
3. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
4. See State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923) (holding an officer may search a
vehicle incident to arrest for evidence that tends to prove the crime of arrest if the vehicle is under
the control of the arrestee); State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 P. 386 (1925) (holding search of a
vehicle incident to arrest need not be for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest); State v. Miller,
151 Wash. 114, 275 P. 75 (1929) (predicating the valid search of a vehicle incident to arrest solely
upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952)
(allowing the search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene
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apparent than in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s
imposition of new guidelines for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest
as announced in Arizona v. Gant.5 Because Washington courts have long
provided that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution
offers broader protections than those available under the Fourth
Amendment,6 Gant has left judges and lawyers in Washington
scrambling to redetermine this already contentious issue.7 A recent oral
argument before the Washington Court of Appeals is particularly
illustrative—hardly had the deputy prosecutor taken the podium before a
perhaps playfully exasperated judge implored, “I hope you can clear this
up!”8
of the arrest, and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest); State v.
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (permitting the search of a vehicle incident to
arrest for evidence of the crime or tools which would aid in the arrested person’s escape, so long as
the vehicle is within the arrestee’s immediate environs). In State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674
P.2d 1240 (1983), the Washington State Supreme Court overruled this line of cases and held that a
search of a vehicle incident to arrest could only be justified by the presence of certain exigencies,
determined by a totality of the circumstances test. This test was subsequently overturned by State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), which adopted a bright-line rule for the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest with the added requirement under article I, section 7 that an officer not
open locked containers. However, Stroud was then overturned by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d.
761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009), which held that “after an arrestee is secured and removed from
the automobile . . . the arrestee’s presence does not justify a warrantless search under the search
incident to arrest exception [and] Stroud’s expansive interpretation to the contrary . . . is overruled.”
5. 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
6. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986) (“[Article I,
section 7 of the] Washington State Constitution affords individuals greater protections against
warrantless searches than does the Fourth Amendment.”).
7. See Audio Recording of Oral Argument, State v. Wright, __ P.3d __, (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)
(No. 62142-4-I), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/OralArgAudio/a01/20091104/2.%20State%20v.
%20Wright%20%20%2062142-4.wma [hereinafter Wright Oral Argument] (debating the post-Gant
preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7); Respondent’s
Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 5, Wright, __ P.3d __, (No. 62142-4-I ) (arguing that the
second Gant exception, allowing an officer to search the passenger compartment incident to arrest
when it is reasonable to believe that it contains evidence of the crime of arrest, applies in
Washington); Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4–6, Wright, __ P.3d __, (No. 62142-4-I)
(arguing that Gant precludes any search of a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee has been
secured away from the scene of the search); see also Brief of Respondent at 68, State v. Jordan, No.
62076-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. filed Aug. 21, 2009) (arguing that the Gant rule allowing officers to
search a car when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be
found inside the vehicle is permitted by article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution);
Brief of Appellant at 36, Jordan, No. 62076-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. filed June 9, 2009) (arguing that
the second Gant rule does not exist under article I, section 7).
8. Wright Oral Argument, supra note 7. Additionally, at an oral argument in February of 2010,
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals allowed counsel for the appellant and respondent to
speak for nearly a combined hour and a half on the question of Gant’s impact on the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7. Audio Recording of Oral Argument, State v.
Mills, No. 62732-5 (Wash. Ct. App. argued Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/
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The lack of clarity lamented by the court of appeals results from the
interaction between article I, section 7, and the new standard contained
in Gant. At the time of Gant’s announcement, the prevailing
understanding among federal courts was that New York v. Belton9
provided a bright-line standard, authorizing an officer to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest irrespective of any concerns for the officer’s safety or the
preservation of evidence.10 Washington State courts adhered to a similar
bright-line standard under State v. Stroud,11 with the added protection, as
required by article I, section 7, that an officer could not open any locked
containers during the search.12
The Gant Court rejected a broad, bright-line reading of Belton, and
reduced the applicability of the search incident to arrest exception to two
situations. First, reasserting concerns expressed earlier in Chimel v.
California,13 the Court held that an officer may search a vehicle incident
to arrest when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment.14 Second, deriving from Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States,15 an officer may search
a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the passenger
compartment.16 The Gant Court therefore established a rule under the
Fourth Amendment that was more protective than the bright-line
standard previously held permissible under Stroud and article I, section 7
of the Washington State Constitution. Given Washington’s long-held
judicial maxim that article I, section 7 provides greater protections than
the Fourth Amendment, Gant thrust Washington law into uncertain
OralArgAudio/a01/20100223/5.%20State%20v.%20Mills%20%20%2062732-5.wma.
9. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
10. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718.
11. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761,
777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009).
12. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441; see also State v. Vrieling, 144 Wash. 2d 489, 492–93, 28 P.3d
762, 765 (2001) (citing Stroud for the proposition that officers may search a vehicle incident to
arrest irrespective of concerns for officer safety or the preservation of evidence); State v. Patterson,
112 Wash. 2d 731, 735, 774 P.2d 10, 12 (1989) (citing Stroud and noting that “concerns for the
safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence do outweigh privacy interests and warrant
a bright-line rule permitting limited searches”).
13. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (limiting a search incident to arrest to the “person and the area from
within which [an arrestee could obtain] either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against [the arrestee]”).
14. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
15. 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
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territory. Since Gant, the Washington State Supreme Court has twice
attempted to reconcile the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under
article I, section 7, with the Fourth Amendment: first in State v. Patton,17
and later in State v. Valdez.18
Part I of this Comment reviews the development of federal law on the
search of a vehicle incident to arrest, specifically with respect to the
Chimel-Belton rule and “relevant evidence rule”19 contained in Gant.
Part II reviews the history of Washington jurisprudence on the search of
a vehicle incident to arrest and the relationship between article I, section
7 and the Fourth Amendment. Part III examines the Washington State
Supreme Court’s efforts in Patton and Valdez to craft a post-Gant
standard in line with both article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV of this
Comment argues that, should the Washington State Supreme Court be
faced with a case that squarely implicates Gant’s relevant evidence rule,
it should adopt a modified version of the rule that contains an added
proscription on the opening of locked containers.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS THE SEARCH OF A
VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER TWO
CONDITIONS

The standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the
Fourth Amendment has fluctuated throughout its modern history.20
Cases in the second half of the twentieth century led to the development
17. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009).
18. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
19. This Comment uses the term “relevant evidence rule” to refer to the rule articulated by Justice
Scalia in his concurring opinion in Thornton, and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Gant. The rule provides that an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable
to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
at 1719 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
20. See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call
for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and
Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77, 80 (2007) (noting the “checkered history” of the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment); Jason Hermele, Comment,
Arizona v. Gant: Rethinking the Evidence-Gathering Justification for the Search Incident to Arrest
Exception, and Testing a New Approach, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 175 (2009) (noting the
“inconsistent history” of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception under the Fourth
Amendment); Kirsten M. Sjue, Comment, Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure: The North
Dakota Supreme Court Considers Whether an Officer May Search a Non-Arrested Person’s Purse
Incident to the Arrest of Another Person in the Same Vehicle, 81 N.D. L. REV. 377, 393 (2005)
(noting that the United States Supreme Court’s search incident to arrest jurisprudence prior to 1969
was “inconsistent and unpredictable”).
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of two main doctrines that provide alternative bases for the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest. The first of these is the Chimel-Belton rule,
which authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in order to
protect officer safety or preserve evidence.21 The second is the relevant
evidence rule, which permits an officer to search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that it contains
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.22 The present incarnation of
both doctrines appears in Gant, which clarified the Chimel-Belton rule
and formally adopted the relevant evidence rule.23
A.

The Chimel-Belton Rule Authorizes the Search of a Vehicle
Incident to Arrest in Order to Protect Officer Safety or Preserve
Evidence

The Chimel-Belton rule24 derives from two flagship federal cases
decided in 196925 and 198126 respectively, although its modern roots are
detectable as early as 1964.27 Interpretations of the Chimel-Belton rule,
which predicates the search of a vehicle incident to arrest upon certain
prerequisite concerns, varied from narrow to expansive over the years
until finally clarified in Gant.28
The Chimel-Belton rule authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to
arrest in order to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence.29 The rule
arises from the Fourth Amendment, which states:
21. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (construing Belton and Chimel to authorize the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search”).
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. For examples of the usage of this term, see United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th
Cir. 1987), referring to a “Chimel/Belton doctrine” and United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d
1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981), referring to a “Chimel/Belton” search.
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
26. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
27. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
28. See infra Part I.C (discussing Gant’s clarification of the Chimel-Belton rule).
29. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (construing Belton and
Chimel to authorize the search of a vehicle incident to arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search”); see also
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (construing Chimel to authorize the rule that, when an officer has lawfully
arrested an occupant of a vehicle, he may search the passenger compartment of that vehicle incident
to arrest); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–68 (noting an officer may search an arrestee incident to arrest in
order to protect officer safety or preserve evidence, but such a search must be limited to the
arrestee’s person or the area from within which he or she might obtain a weapon or something that
could be used as evidence against him or her); Preston, 376 U.S. at 367 (1964) (noting a search
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.30
As far back as 1925, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless
search of a vehicle may meet the criterion of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.31 Although a warrantless search is generally
unreasonable,32 the Court developed an exception to the warrant
requirement for valid searches incident to arrest.33
The beginnings of the modern development of the Chimel-Belton rule
are illustrated by the 1964 case Preston v. United States.34 In Preston,
the United States Supreme Court required proximity in “time or place”
for a valid search of a vehicle incident to arrest.35 The case arose when
officers arrested and removed the passengers of a car, drove it to police
headquarters, and then searched the car and found drug paraphernalia.36
The Court ruled that the search did not constitute a valid search incident
to arrest because such searches are justified by the need to protect officer
safety and preserve destructible or concealable evidence, and must
therefore be proximate to the arrest in both time and place.37
In 1969, Chimel further limited the search incident to arrest exception
to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.38 Chimel stemmed
from a situation in which officers confronted a suspect and executed an
arrest warrant against him in his home.39 The officers searched the entire
house incident to arrest and seized numerous items, which were admitted
against the defendant at trial.40 The California Supreme Court upheld the
defendant’s resulting conviction and the admission of evidence because

incident to arrest is justified by the need to protect officer safety or preserve evidence of the crime
of arrest and extends to the arrestee’s person and area within his immediate control).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
34. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
35. Id. at 367.
36. Id. at 365–66.
37. Id. at 367–68.
38. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
39. Id. at 753.
40. Id. at 753–54.
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“the search of the petitioner’s home had been justified . . . [as] incident
to a valid arrest,”41 but the United States Supreme Court reversed.42
Drawing on its reasoning in Preston,43 the Court reasoned that, although
the arrest itself was valid,
[t]he search . . . went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the
area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon
or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a
search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.44
The Court reaffirmed the Fourth Amendment principle that a search
incident to arrest must remain limited to the area within the arrestee’s
“immediate control,” defined as “the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”45
In 1981, Belton extended the Chimel “immediate control” test to the
search of an automobile incident to arrest.46 In that case, an officer
removed multiple suspects from a vehicle, arrested them for possession
of marijuana, and secured them in separate locations.47 The officer then
searched each suspect individually, as well as the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, where he found a jacket containing
cocaine.48
The United States Supreme Court ruled the search constitutional.49
The Court referred to its reasoning in Chimel, noting that “a lawful
custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous
search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately
surrounding area.”50 The Court stated further that “[s]uch searches have
long been considered valid because of the need ‘to remove any weapons
that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of
evidence.”51

41. Id. at 754–55.
42. Id. at 768.
43. Id. at 763–64 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
44. Id. at 768.
45. Id. at 763.
46. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
47. Id. at 455–56.
48. Id. at 456.
49. Id. at 462–63.
50. Id. at 457 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
51. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
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However, the Court was unable to find within existing case law
“[any] workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of
the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an
automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.”52 Instead, the Court
found that case law “suggest[ed] the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m].’”53 Accordingly, the Court held that “when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search
the passenger compartment of that automobile,” including “the contents
of any containers found within the passenger compartment.”54
Importantly, the Court further noted that its holding “in no way alter[ed]
the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”55
Finally, in applying its reasoning to the arrestee’s case, the Court held
that, because “the jacket was located inside the passenger compartment
of the car,” it was “‘within the arrestee’s immediate control.’”56 The
search of the jacket, the Court found, was therefore a search incident to a
lawful custodial arrest.57
Notably, Belton allowed the search incident to arrest of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle, even after the arrestees had been secured and
removed from the vehicle.58 This generated confusion among the lower
courts,59 and fostered expansive interpretations of the Chimel-Belton
rule—i.e. that Belton loosened the preconditions for the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest to the point where an officer could permissibly
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, completely irrespective

52. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
53. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 460 n.3.
56. Id. at 462 (quoting Chimel, 495 at 763).
57. Id. at 462–63.
58. Id. at 456.
59. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 & n.2 (2009) (reviewing lower court
treatment of the Belton rule).
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of the location of the arrestee.60 Not until Gant did the Court address and
sharply correct this apparent drift.61
B.

The Relevant Evidence Rule Permits an Officer to Search the
Passenger Compartment of a Vehicle When It Is Reasonable to
Believe It Contains Evidence Relevant to the Crime of Arrest

The relevant evidence rule provides an alternative basis for the search
of a vehicle incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment, one that
does not depend upon the justifications of protecting officer safety or
preserving evidence.62 Justice Scalia first articulated this rule in his
concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States,63 in which he argued
that searches of a vehicle incident to arrest are instead justified by the
reasonable belief that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be
found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.64 This Section
reviews Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Thornton.
Thornton addressed the question of whether Belton allowed officers
to search a vehicle incident to arrest even when the arrestee was not first
contacted until after leaving the vehicle.65 The majority held that Belton
did permit such a search, providing that “[s]o long as an arrestee is [a]
60. Id. at 1718 (“[Belton] has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle
at the time of the search.”)
61. See infra Part I.C. It should also be noted that the Gant Court split on the issue of whether the
first prong contained in that opinion represented the re-narrowing of an exception that had been
misinterpreted by lower courts or the promulgation of a new standard altogether. The lead opinion,
written by Justice Stevens, and joined by justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, treated the
first prong as a clarification of Chimel-Belton searches—i.e., a course correction for an exception
that had steadily expanded beyond its roots. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“[W]e reject this [broad]
reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to
a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”). Although he joined the majority, Justice Scalia
also wrote separately and cautioned that the lead opinion had mischaracterized the reality of the
development of the search incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1724
(Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Scalia argued that Belton and Thornton really had stated
broad rules, allowing precisely the type of non-present arrestee searches that Gant was now
characterizing as historically impermissible. Id. (“[T]he rule set forth in [Belton] and [Thornton]” is
actually that “arresting officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect
themselves from hidden weapons.” (citations omitted)).
62. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (adopting the relevant evidence rule from Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Thornton, and noting that it does not follow from Chimel); Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest provides an alternative basis for a search incident to arrest).
63. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
64. Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
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‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle . . . officers may search that vehicle
incident to the arrest.”66 In reaching this conclusion, the majority cited
two primary justifications: first, that recent occupants presented
“identical concerns” to officer safety and the destruction of evidence;67
and second, that law enforcement needs justified a bright line rule, such
as that provided by Belton.68
Justice Scalia found the Court’s application of the Chimel-Belton rule
misguided.69 First, Justice Scalia noted that at the time of the officer’s
search of the vehicle, the suspect was secured in the officer’s patrol
car.70 The suspect was therefore “neither in, nor anywhere near, the
passenger compartment of the vehicle,” and “[t]he risk that he would
nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was
remote in the extreme.”71
Justice Scalia then enumerated three possible justifications for
applying the Chimel-Belton rule to the instant case, in spite of its
apparent inappositeness, and rejected each in turn.72 He concluded that,
“[i]f Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might
grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the
car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was
arrested.”73 Justice Scalia explained:
This more general sort of evidence-gathering search is not
without antecedent. For example, in United States v. Rabinowitz,
66. Id. at 623–24 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 621.
68. Id. at 622–23 (“The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not
depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any
particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.”).
69. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court’s effort to apply [the Chimel-Belton rule] to this
search stretches it beyond its breaking point . . . .”).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
72. The first possible justification was that the suspect could escape his handcuffs, and grab
something from the car. Id. at 625–26 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia rejected this
justification on the grounds that the government had not demonstrated that this was an appreciable
risk. Id. at 626–27. The second was that limiting the search of a vehicle incident to arrest to settings
in which a suspect is still in the car at the time of arrest would force police to leave suspects in a
dangerous position in order to search the vehicle. Id. at 627. Justice Scalia dismissed this
explanation because it is not the right of the police to search a vehicle without a warrant. Id. The
third justification was that Belton searches are generally reasonable and that the benefits of a brightline rule justify upholding the minority of searches that are not (especially because the practice of
securing suspects is so prevalent that finding a search in such situations unreasonable would largely
render Belton moot). Id. at 627–28. Justice Scalia rejected this final justification on principle, stating
that the need for clarity cannot be held to outweigh constitutional requirements. Id. at 628–29.
73. Id. at 629.
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we upheld a search of the suspect’s place of business after he
was arrested there. We did not restrict the officers’ search
authority to “the area into which [the] arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m],” and we did not
justify the search as a means to prevent concealment or
destruction of evidence. Rather, we relied on a more general
interest in gathering evidence relevant to the crime for which the
suspect had been arrested.74
Justice Scalia then cited multiple federal cases, English cases, and
treatises, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century.75 According to
Justice Scalia, these authorities established an approach “referring to the
general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with
no mention of the more specific interest in preventing its concealment or
destruction.”76 “Only in the years leading up to Chimel,” he asserted,
“did we start consistently referring to the narrower interest in frustrating
concealment or destruction of evidence.”77 Ultimately, Justice Scalia
conceded that both the narrow approach contained in Chimel, and the
broader approach contained in Rabinowitz, were “plausible accounts of
what the Constitution requires.”78 He nevertheless concluded that
“Belton [could not] reasonably be explained as a mere application of
Chimel.”79 Instead, Belton marked “a return to the broader sort of search
incident to arrest that [was] allowed before Chimel—limited . . . to
searches of motor vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a
reduced expectation of privacy, and heightened law enforcement
needs.”80 In this context, according to Justice Scalia, the only thing that
74. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia relied here upon United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), despite the fact that its search incident to arrest doctrine was
disapproved by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1961) (“[The
Rabinowitz] doctrine . . . can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis.”). Id. However,
Justice Scalia’s point in his Thornton concurrence was simply that because the facts of the case did
not present the concerns that justified a Chimel-Belton search—i.e., officer safety or preservation of
evidence—something else must have justified the search: the relevancy of the evidence sought. “[I]f
we are going to continue to allow Belton searches on stare decisis grounds,” wrote Justice Scalia,
“we should at least be honest about why we are doing so.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia further sought to rehabilitate the Rabinowitz doctrine
on the grounds that it was “‘not general or exploratory for whatever might be turned up’ but
reflected a reasonable belief that evidence would be found.” Id. at 632 (quoting Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. at 62–63).
75. Id. at 629–30.
76. Id. at 629.
77. Id. at 630 (citing, inter alia, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)).
78. Id. at 631.
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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could rationally justify the search of a vehicle incident to arrest was the
relevancy of the evidence sought to the crime of arrest.81 Thus, the
relevant evidence rule was born, but was not adopted as a majority rule
until 2009 in Gant.82
C.

In Gant, the United States Supreme Court Clarified the ChimelBelton Rule and Adopted the Relevant Evidence Rule

With its 2009 ruling in Gant, the Supreme Court corrected the steady
expansion of the Chimel-Belton rule beyond its original justifications
and adopted Justice Scalia’s relevant evidence rule.83 In so doing, the
Court announced two rules that provide the sole permissible
preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the
Fourth Amendment.84 The first rule, arising from Chimel and Belton,
allows an officer to search a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee
is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment.85 The second, drawing upon Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Thornton, provides that an officer may search a vehicle
incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle.86
1.

Gant Clarifies the Chimel-Belton Rule

The expansive interpretation of the Chimel-Belton rule that
proliferated in the wake of Belton was sharply set aside by Gant. Like
Belton, Gant involved the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a
suspect arrested for driving with a suspended license and securely
81. Id.
82. In the meantime, lower courts took notice of Justice Scalia’s reasoning. The Sixth Circuit, for
example, discussed Justice Scalia’s adoption of a relevant evidence standard in an unpublished
opinion, but noted that the question was “not open for lower courts . . . to consider.” United States v.
Jones, 155 F. App’x 204, 208 (6th Cir. 2005). In another unpublished opinion in the First Circuit, a
district court noted the rule, but cautioned that “[t]he standards for Justice Scalia’s proposed rule [in
Thornton] have not been fully developed.” United States v. Walston, No. CR. 04-78-B-W, 2005 WL
757592, at *3 n.3 (D. Me. Mar. 14, 2005). Similarly, Judge Gibson of the Eighth Circuit, citing
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton, noted that “some have expressed concern with the
soundness of the entire Belton framework.” United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1107 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1006) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
83. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of
Belton and adopting the relevant evidence standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest from
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton, even though it does not follow from Chimel).
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also supra note 21.
86. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
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handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the time of the search.87 The
officers searched Gant’s car, finding a gun and a bag of cocaine in the
pocket of a jacket in the backseat.88
At Gant’s trial for narcotics charges stemming from evidence located
in his vehicle, the Arizona trial court ruled that the search of Gant’s car
was valid incident to arrest, and he was convicted.89 The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the bright-line rule contained in
Belton referred only to the scope of the search of a vehicle incident to
arrest and did not authorize such a search unless the exigencies
contained in Chimel existed as preconditions to the search.90
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme
Court’s narrow reading of Belton.91 The Court concluded:
To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every
recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly
incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful
custodial arrests.”92
Because officers searched Gant’s vehicle after he had been removed
and secured, Chimel’s twin concerns of officer safety and preservation
of evidence were not implicated, and the search of Gant’s car was
therefore unreasonable.93

87. Id. at 1715.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1715–16.
91. Id. at 1719.
92. Id. at 1719 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981)). Though the Court in
Belton, quoted here in Gant, used the word “scope,” this Comment assumes that the Belton Court
meant to express that its ruling did not alter the preconditions necessary for the search of a vehicle
incident to arrest (i.e., that even under Belton, an arrestee would still have to present concerns for
officer safety or the preservation of evidence, hence the Gant Court’s requirement that an arrestee
be unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment). The Court’s use of the
word “scope” in Belton—and as understood by the Gant Court—was informal and colloquial, and,
given the likely confusion presented here with the legal term of art as it applies to searches, an
unfortunate coincidence.
93. Id. at 1719.
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Gant Adopted the Relevant Evidence Rule

After clarifying the Chimel-Belton rule, the Supreme Court proceeded
to adopt the relevant evidence rule.94 Citing Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Thornton, but without any further analysis, the Gant Court
provided that “[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, we also
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”95
Even under this standard, the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, because “[w]hereas Belton and Thornton
were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a
suspended license—an offense for which police could not expect to find
evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car.”96 In other words,
the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
for two reasons: first, at the time of the search, Gant was safely secured
in the back of a patrol car and thus posed no threat to officer safety or
evidentiary preservation; and second, police could not have reasonably
expected to find any evidence in Gant’s vehicle relevant to the crime of
driving without a license. Thus, the Court created a new two-prong
approach to determining reasonableness of searches incident to arrest
under the Fourth Amendment.
II.

THE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST
EXCEPTION IN WASHINGTON STEMS FROM BOTH
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW

The case law regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in
Washington dates back to the 1920s,97 but its underlying rationale is
rooted in the adoption of article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution in 1889,98 and English common law.99 The present
94. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
95. Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841, 843 (1923) (allowing a
warrantless search incident to arrest of a vehicle and suitcases therein).
98. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 497
(Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL].
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 106, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914). The
Washington State Supreme Court cited Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), for the
proposition that “the right to search the person of one under legal arrest . . . has always been
recognized under English and American law, and has been uniformly maintained in many cases.”
Brown, 83 Wash. at 106, 145 P. at 71 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
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controversy over the search incident to arrest is best understood as the
function of a complicated interplay between federal and Washington
law, as old as the exception itself. Early on, Washington courts
concentrated their analysis of the exception to the warrant requirement
under a combination of article I, section 7 and common law
jurisprudence.100 As the century progressed, the courts turned
increasingly to the Fourth Amendment, before refocusing on article I,
section 7 in the 1980s.101 Now, after Gant, Washington courts are again
faced with the challenge of recalibrating Washington law in light of the
Fourth Amendment.
Despite its length and complexity, the pre-Gant law of vehicle
searches incident to arrest in Washington may be broadly divided into
five developmental stages. The Washington State Supreme Court has
recognized three initial stages during which Washington courts turned
increasingly from article I, section 7 and common law toward federal
law.102 In a self-declared return to Washington law, the case of State v.
Ringer103 marks a brief fourth stage, which allowed the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest only under certain exigent circumstances.104 A
fifth stage began with State v. Stroud, which promulgated a bright-line
standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.105 This standard
survived until 2009, when Gant generated the present uncertainty.

100. See State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690–94, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243–1244 (1983) (noting
that Washington courts defined the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in the early days
of its fashioning in light of article I, section 7 and common law).
101. See id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247 (“We choose now to return to the protections of our own
constitution and to interpret them consistent with their common law beginnings.”); see also State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 146, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (1986) (noting the Court’s intention “to define
more precisely the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement implied in article
1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution”).
102. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 698, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“We perceive three stages in the prior
development of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.”).
103. Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247 (1983) (announcing a return to article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution in order to define the search of a vehicle incident to arrest).
104. Id. at 698–702, 674 P.2d at 1247–49; see also State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 514, 987
P.2d 73 (1999) (“[I]n Ringer, we . . . . adopted a case-by-case ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to
determine whether the exigencies in fact supported a warrantless search [incident to arrest] in any
given case.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
105. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986) (“During the arrest process, including the
time immediately subsequent to the suspect’s being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car,
officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or
destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove
compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant.”).
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Washington’s Early Understanding of a Search Incident to Arrest
Was Rooted in Article I, Section 7, as Informed by Common Law

Early incarnations of the search incident to arrest exception in
Washington allowed an officer to search the person of an arrestee for
evidence “which the officer reasonably believes to be connected with the
supposed crime.”106 This understanding derived from article I, section 7
and the common law.107 Therefore, a proper historical analysis of the
search incident to arrest exception in Washington begins with these
sources.
The Washington State Constitutional Convention adopted article I,
section 7 in 1889,108 as follows:
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.109
Significantly, records show that the constitutional convention
considered text identical to the Fourth Amendment, but rejected it in
favor of the wording adopted for article I, section 7.110 Courts and
scholars have interpreted this choice to demonstrate the framers’ intent
that article I, section 7 offers citizens greater protections than those
available under the Fourth Amendment.111
106. State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 105, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914).
107. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 773, 224 P.3d 751, 757 (2009) (In order to define the
search incident to arrest exception, “[the Washington State Supreme Court] look[s] at the
constitutional text, the origins and law at the time [the Washington] constitution was adopted, and
the evolution of that law and its doctrinal development.”); Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 149, 720 P.2d at
439 (determining the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in Washington solely on
independent state grounds, i.e., in light of article I, section 7); id. at 153–54, 720 P.2d at 441–42
(Durham, J., concurring) (noting that defining the automobile search incident to arrest exception
requires an interpretation of article I, section 7); Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 720 P.2d at 1242–43
(recounting the history of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in Washington through the lens of
article I, section 7).
108. See JOURNAL, supra note 98, at 497.
109. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
110. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 720 P.2d at 1243 (citing JOURNAL, supra note 98, at 51,
497).
111. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 161 Wash. 2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469, 471 (2007) (“‘[T]he search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is narrower’ under article I, section 7 than
under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting State v. O’Neil, 148 Wash. 2d 564, 584, 62 P.3d 489, 501
(2003))); Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (“[Article I, section 7 of the]
Washington State Constitution affords individuals greater protections against warrantless searches
than does the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153
(1984) (“[T]he unique language of [article I, section 7] provides greater protection to persons under
the Washington Constitution than [the Fourth Amendment] provides to persons generally.” (citing
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984))); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814,
676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also JONATHAN BECHTLE & MICHAEL REITZ, TO PROTECT AND
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The Washington State Supreme Court first expressed the common
law search incident to arrest doctrine in State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown.112
In that case, an officer seized evidence from the person of a suspect upon
making a warrantless arrest.113 The Court discussed the officer’s
authority to search and seize the papers without a warrant in dicta:
The general rule is that, where a person is legally arrested, the
arresting officer has a right to search such person, and take from
his possession money or goods which the officer reasonably
believes to be connected with the supposed crime, and
discoveries made in this lawful search may be shown at the trial
in evidence.114
In discussing this authority, the Brown Court cited the principle
expressed in Weeks v. United States,115 that “such [a] right has always
been recognized under English and American law, and has been
uniformly maintained in many cases.”116 Thus, the early interpretation of
search incident to arrest under article I, section 7 appeared to derive
directly from English and American common law.
B.

The Search of a Vehicle Incident to Arrest Exception Fluctuated
Between 1923 and 1962

The preconditions under Washington’s search incident to arrest
exception fluctuated between 1923 and 1962.117 In the beginning of this
MAINTAIN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE
I, at 23 (2008) (noting that cases interpreting article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution grant individuals greater protections than the Fourth Amendment); ROBERT F. UTTER
& HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 20–22 (2002)
(noting instances in which the Washington State Supreme Court has declared article I, section 7 to
offer greater protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment).
112. 83 Wash. 100, 145 P. 69 (1914); see also Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 693, 720 P.2d at 1244
(“The earliest expression of the common law ‘search incident to arrest’ doctrine in Washington is
found in [Brown].”).
113. Brown, 83 Wash. at 101–02, 145 P. at 69–70.
114. Id. at 105–06, 145 P. at 71.
115. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
116. Brown, 83 Wash. at 106, 145 P. at 71 (quoting Weeks, 232 U. S. at 392).
117. The cases discussed in this section—State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841, 843
(1923), allowing a search incident to arrest for offense-relevant evidence at the time of arrest and in
the area under an arrestee’s control; State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 230–31, 239 P. 386, 387 (1925),
holding a search of a vehicle incident to arrest need not be for evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest; State v. Miller, 151 Wash. 114, 115, 275 P. 75, 75 (1929), predicating the valid search of a
vehicle incident to arrest solely upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest; State v. McCollum, 17 Wash.
2d 85, 89 136 P.2d 165, 167 (1943), upholding the search of a home incident to the arrest of a nonpresent arrestee; State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 844–45, 246 P.2d 480, 484 (1952), allowing the
search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene of the arrest,
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period, the Washington State Supreme Court required both that the
arrestee be physically proximate to the scene of the search and that the
evidence sought be relevant to the crime of arrest.118 In the following
years, the Court alternatively employed standards that lacked any such
relevant evidence requirement119 and that increasingly relaxed the
physical proximity requirement, eventually rendering it effectively
nominal.120
Washington’s first application of the search incident to arrest
exception to the automobile context121 came in 1923 with State v.
Hughlett.122 There, the Court required both physical proximity of the
arrestee to the location of the search and limited the scope of the search
to evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.123 The Court upheld the
search of the suspect’s car and suitcase contained therein and the seizure
of bootleg whiskey found in both.124 The justices reasoned:
It has always been held that a peace officer, when he makes a
lawful arrest, may lawfully, without a search warrant, search the
person arrested and take from him any evidence tending to prove
the crime with which he is charged. From this it seems to us to
follow logically that a similar search, under the same
circumstances, may be made of the automobile of which he has
possession and control at the time of his arrest. This is true
because the person arrested has the immediate physical
possession, not only of the grips or suit cases which he is
carrying, but also of the automobile which he is driving and of
which he has control.125
Just two years after Hughlett, the Court abandoned the requirement
that the evidence sought be relevant to the crime of arrest. In State v.
and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest; and State v. Jackovick, 56
Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960), allowing officers to search incident to arrest the area
where the arrest is made—were overruled “to a greater or lesser degree” in 1983 by State v. Ringer,
100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 720 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Hughlett, 124 Wash. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44.
119. See, e.g., Deitz, 136 Wash. at 231, 239 P. at 387.
120. See, e.g., Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d at 844, 246 P.2d at 483–84.
121. In one earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court refused to apply the search incident
to arrest exception to the warrantless search and seizure of contraband from the arrestee’s
automobile because the arrest itself was invalid. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 182–83, 203 P.
390, 394 (1922). The Court did not discuss whether the search incident to arrest exception would
have applied, and by what criteria, had the arrest been lawful. Id.
122. 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923).
123. Id. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44.
124. Id. at 371, 214 P. at 844.
125. Id. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44.
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Deitz,126 officers searched a car and seized evidence from it after
observing Deitz driving without proper license plates and with defective
lights.127 The Court upheld the search as incident to arrest, holding that
even though Deitz was arrested for a traffic violation whereas the search
was for contraband, the lack of relevance of the evidence seized to the
crime of arrest did not warrant suppression.128
Between 1929 and 1962, the Washington State Supreme Court
decided several cases that relaxed, if not effectively abandoned, the
requirement of an arrestee’s physical presence at the location of a search
incident to arrest.129 In State v. Miller,130 the Court upheld the search of
the arrestee’s car for contraband solely on the basis that the officers had
made a valid warrantless arrest, and gave no weight to the arrestee’s
presence at the time of the search.131 Later, in State v. McCollum,132 a
case that did not involve a vehicle, the Court upheld a search incident to
arrest of the arrestee’s home conducted when the arrestee was
hospitalized.133 In State v. Cyr,134 the Court upheld the search of a
vehicle as valid incident to arrest, even though the arrestee was not
present at the time of the search, because the automobile itself was
“parked reasonably close” to the place of arrest, and the officer had
“good reason” to believe that evidence pertinent to the charge would be

126. 136 Wash. 228, 239 P. 386 (1925).
127. Id. at 228–29, 239 P. at 386–87. Notably, the officers seized evidence from the trunk of the
arrestee’s car, not the passenger compartment. Id. at 229, 239 P. at 387. However, it appears that,
rather than abandoning the requirement that the arrestee be physically proximate to the search, the
Court considered the trunk to be an area within the arrestee’s control. See id. at 231, 239 P. at 387
(noting police may search an arrestee’s person or the area within his control incident to arrest (citing
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925))).
128. Deitz, 136 Wash. at 231, 239 P. at 387.
129. See State v. Miller, 151 Wash. 114, 115, 275 P. 75, 75 (1929) (predicating the valid search
of a vehicle incident to arrest solely upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest); State v. McCollum, 17
Wash. 2d 85, 89, 136 P.2d 165, 167 (1943) (upholding the search of a home incident to the arrest of
a non-present arrestee); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 844–45, 246 P.2d 480, 484 (1952) (allowing
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene of the
arrest and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest); State v. Jackovick,
56 Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960) (allowing a search incident to arrest to encompass
“the area where the arrest was made.”); see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 696, 674 P.2d
1240, 1246 (1983) (“After [the Miller decision in 1929], this court even abandoned the presence of
the arrestee at the place of the search as a necessary predicate to its validity.”).
130. 151 Wash. 114, 275 P. 75 (1929).
131. Id. at 117–18, 275 P. at 76.
132. 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P.2d 165 (1943).
133. Id. at 89–90, 136 P.2d at 167.
134. 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952).
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found in the vehicle.135 Finally, the Court once again upheld the search
of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a non-present arrestee in State v.
Jackovick,136 on grounds that officers may permissibly search “the area
where the arrest is made.”137
This trend of relaxation ended in 1962, when, in State v. Michaels138
the Court strengthened its rule regarding the requirement of an arrestee’s
physical presence at the scene of the search (while maintaining its
requirement that such searches is for evidence of the crime of arrest).139
In Michaels, the Court examined the search of a car for contraband after
the driver had been arrested for a simple traffic violation.140 The Court
found the search unlawful,141 and stated the rule that “an officer may
take into custody a person who commits a misdemeanor in his presence,
and upon making the arrest, may search the person and his immediate
environs for evidence of the crime or tools which would aid in the
arrested person’s escape.”142 While the Court invalidated the search on
the grounds that the evidence sought was not relevant to the offense of
arrest,143 the Court’s strong language regarding physical proximity—that
a search incident to arrest may only encompass the arrestee’s
“immediate environs”144—expressed a standard far more stringent than
in previous decisions.145

135. Id. at 844, 246 P.2d at 483.
136. 56 Wash. 2d 915, 355 P.2d 976 (1960).
137. Id. at 917, 355 P.2d at 977.
138. 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
139. Id. at 642–43, 374 P.2d at 991; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 696, 720 P.2d
1240, 1246 (1983) (“Finally, in [Michaels], this court began to impose restrictions on the authority
of police to make searches pursuant to arrest.” (citation omitted)).
140. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d at 639–40, 374 P.2d at 990.
141. Id. at 645, 374 P.2d at 993 (“The evidence in this case conclusively shows that the arrest was
made for the sole purpose of searching the automobile to ascertain whether it contained any
contraband property. It was a mere pretext for the search and was therefore unlawful. Consequently,
the defendant’s motions to suppress should have been granted.”).
142. Id. at 642–43, 374 P.2d at 991.
143. Id. at 645, 374 P.2d at 993.
144. Id. at 643, 374 P.2d at 991.
145. Id.; cf. State v. Jackovick, 56 Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960) (allowing a
search incident to arrest to encompass “the area where the arrest was made”); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash.
2d 840, 844, 246 P.2d 480, 483 (1952) (allowing the search incident to arrest of a vehicle that was
parked “reasonably close” to the scene of the arrest).
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Washington Turned to the Fourth Amendment for Almost Twenty
Years before Announcing a Return to Article I, Section 7 in 1983

In the years after Michaels, the Washington State Supreme Court
turned away from article I, section 7 and looked to federal jurisprudence
to determine the limits of searches of vehicles incident to arrest.146 In
1983, however, in State v. Ringer,147 the Washington State Supreme
Court conducted a sweeping review of the evolution of the search of a
vehicle incident to arrest exception in Washington, and explicitly
identified three stages of development therein, before announcing the
beginning of a fourth stage.148 The Court found that the search incident
to arrest exception had been allowed to expand beyond its initial
purpose149 and professed to “return to the protections of [the
Washington] constitution and to interpret them consistent with their
common law beginnings.”150 The Court provided:
146. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 697, 720 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983) (“In the years
immediately following Michaels, this court disregarded the plethora of cases interpreting [article I,
section 7] and began instead to rely on federal cases interpreting [the Fourth Amendment].”). In
Ringer, the Washington State Supreme Court identified several instances in which the court turned
to the Fourth Amendment in order to interpret the search of a vehicle incident to arrest. In State v.
Riggins, for example, the Court looked extensively to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), and found the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment controlling with respect to the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in
Washington. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 697, 720 P.2d at 1246–47 (citing Riggins, 64 Wash. 2d
881, 886, 395 P.2d 85, 89–90 (1964)). Similarly, in State v. Johnson, the Washington State Supreme
Court “continued to rely on federal precedent,” but also “continued to require that a search incident
to arrest be for evidence of the crime for which the defendant was arrested.” Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d
at 697–98, 720 P.2d at 1247 (citing Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 243, 427 P.2d 705, 707 (1967)).
Finally, in State v. Simpson, the Court invalidated a search incident to arrest “because the [arrestee]
was not in the truck when arrested and had already been removed from the area when the search of
the truck took place,” but did so using federal precedent. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 698, 720 P.2d at
1247 (quoting Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 191, 622 P.2d 1199, 1212 (1980)).
147. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
148. Id. at 698–99, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“We perceive three stages in the prior development of the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The exception began as a narrow rule
intended solely to protect against frustration of the arrest itself or destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. This was the scope of the exception when [article I, section 7] was adopted. In the early
20th century, however, both the federal courts and the courts of this state, with little or no reasoned
analysis, expanded the exception until it threatened to swallow the general rule that a warrant is
required. From 1964, when Preston v. United States was decided, until 1981, when it decided New
York v. Belton, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the search incident to arrest exception
in a manner consistent with its common law origins. In those years we neglected our own state
constitution to focus instead on protections provided by [the Fourth Amendment]. . . . We choose
now to return to the protections of our own constitution and to interpret them consistent with their
common law beginnings.” (citations omitted)).
149. Id. at 698, 720 P.2d at 1247.
150. Id. at 699, 720 P.2d at 1247.
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Based on our understanding of [article I, section 7], we conclude
that, when a lawful arrest is made, the arresting officer may
search the person arrested and the area within his immediate
control. A warrantless search in this situation is permissible only
to remove any weapons the arrestee might seek to use in order
to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of
evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is
arrested.151
The Court therefore announced that, in keeping with its declared
return to article I, section 7, the search incident to arrest exception would
be narrowed to the arrestee’s person and area within his immediate
control, and authorized only for the purposes of protecting officer safety
and the integrity of the arrest, or to preserve evidence of the crime of
arrest.152 In doing so, the Court also overturned prior cases that had
expanded the exception.153
D.

Washington Abandoned Ringer for a Bright-Line Rule in Stroud

A mere three years after deciding Ringer, the Washington State
Supreme Court overturned it in favor of a bright-line rule.154 In State v.
Stroud, the Court departed dramatically from its narrow Ringer
approach.155 In Stroud, two law enforcement officers arrested two
defendants next to a parked car after observing them apparently
attempting to rob a vending machine.156 The officer searched the car,
151. Id., 720 P.2d at 1248 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
152. Id., 720 P.2d at 1248; see also UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 111, at 4 (explaining that with
Ringer, the Court announced an approach to analyzing searches incident to arrest by interpreting
article I, section 7 “by reference to the common law of search and seizure as it existed when the
Washington Constitution was adopted”).
153. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“[W]e find it necessary to overrule several
of our previous cases. To a greater or lesser degree, [Hughlett, Deitz, Miller, McCollum, Cyr, and
Jackovick] are all without historic foundation and are inconsistent with traditional protections
against the ability of law enforcement officers to make warrantless searches and seizures.”); see also
supra Part II.B.
154. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151–52, 720 P.2d 436, 440–41 (1986), overruled by State
v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009). However, Ringer was discussed
favorably by the Washington State Supreme Court in the years between 1983 and 1986. See, e.g.,
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 742 n.6, 689 P.2d 1065, 1070 n.6 (1984) (“In Ringer, this
court declined to follow federal precedents governing the Fourth Amendment and searches incident
to arrest. Relying on [article I, section 7], we limited police officers’ right to search incident to an
arrest to those circumstances when police are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do
not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause
applications for warrants by police officers.”).
155. 106 Wash. 2d at 151, 720 P.2d at 440.
156. Id. at 145, 720 P.2d at 437.
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finding a weapon and various drug paraphernalia.157 The car was then
impounded, and police seized additional items during an inventory
search.158
After their conviction, the defendants appealed on the basis that the
trial court should have suppressed items seized during the warrantless
search of the vehicle.159 The court of appeals certified the question to the
Washington State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.160 In
doing so, the Court sought explicitly to “define more precisely the scope
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement implied in
Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.”161
The Court first noted that federal cases, such as Belton, had recently
“enlarged the narrow exceptions to the prohibition in the Fourth
Amendment against warrantless searches.”162 If decided under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, the search of the car in Stroud
would easily be upheld as incident to the defendants’ lawful arrests.163
However, the Court declined to decide the case on Fourth Amendment
grounds because the “Washington State Constitution affords individuals
greater protections against warrantless searches than does the Fourth
Amendment.”164
Although the Court applied “the more protective standards of Article
I, Section 7,” it “nevertheless [held] the search of defendants’ car
lawful.”165 In doing so, the Court was forced to overturn the part of
Ringer requiring “actual exigent circumstances,”166 determined by “the
totality of the circumstances”167 on a “case-by-case basis.”168 The Court
justified its decision on the basis that “[t]he Ringer holding [made] it
virtually impossible for officers to decide whether or not a warrantless
search would be permissible,” and added that “[w]eighing the ‘totality of
circumstances’ [was] too much of a burden to put on police officers who
must make a decision to search with little more than a moment’s
157. Id. at 146, 720 P.2d at 437.
158. Id., 720 P.2d at 438.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 147, 720 P.2d at 438.
163. Id. at 148, 720 P.2d at 439.
164. Id., 720 P.2d at 439.
165. Id. at 150, 720 P.2d at 440.
166. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
167. Id. at 150, 720 P.2d at 440.
168. Id. at 151, 720 P.2d at 440.

Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

378

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5/17/2010 10:24 AM

[Vol. 85:355

reflection.”169 The Court buttressed this argument by pointing to the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Belton but declined to
reach Belton’s conclusion, stressing the heightened privacy requirements
of article I, section 7.170 The Court instead concluded:
During the arrest process, including the time immediately
subsequent to the suspect’s being arrested, handcuffed, and
placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible
evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container
or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search
either container without obtaining a warrant.171
The Stroud bright-line rule resembled the Belton rule, but with the
added limitation that police could not open locked containers or a locked
glove compartment without first obtaining a warrant, an imposition
necessary to satisfy the heightened privacy requirements of article I,
section 7.172 This resemblance to Belton notwithstanding, the Stroud
Court carefully stated that “[w]e wish to make clear that
our . . . determination in this case is not based on prior federal case law,
and that we decide this case solely on independent state grounds.”173
Stroud thus established a rule especially conscious of the pragmatic
concerns of law enforcement under article I, section 7 that would remain
intact until the United States Supreme Court announced Gant in 2009.

169. Id. The type of concerns expressed here by the Stroud Court continue to be articulated by
law enforcement officers. Since Gant, for example, officers of the Seattle Police Department have
reported that the concept of an arrestee being “unsecured” and “within reaching distance” of the
passenger compartment is too vague to be workable in the field. Telephone Interview with Scott
Bachler, Lieutenant, Seattle Police Dep’t (Feb. 17, 2010). Under what exact conditions is an arrestee
considered “unsecured”? What exact area is considered “within reaching distance” of the passenger
compartment? These sort of ad hoc determinations, required by the first prong of Gant, implicate
the Stroud Court’s criticism of a rule requiring officers to make a snap determination of whether a
search would be permissible, with little in the way of guidance. In contrast, the relevant evidence
rule at least provides officers with some form of functional guidance. Id. The determination that
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the passenger compartment is one that
officers can safely and effectively make in the field. Id.
170. 106 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 720 P.2d at 440; see also supra Part I.A (discussing Belton).
171. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 149, 720 P.2d at 439.

Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

5/17/2010 10:24 AM

WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AFTER GANT

379

III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS
REVISITED THE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE INCIDENT TO
ARREST EXCEPTION POST-GANT
In its first major post-Gant decisions,174 the Washington State
Supreme Court examined the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in
State v. Patton175 and State v. Valdez.176 Patton required that either a
concern for officer safety or the preservation of relevant evidence exist
at the time of the search for a search incident to arrest to be valid.177 Two
months later, the Valdez Court—without mentioning Patton—affirmed a
near-identical standard.178 Patton and Valdez brought Washington law in
line with the clarified Chimel-Belton rule contained in Gant’s first
prong. However, neither case explicitly adopted or excluded Gant’s
second prong—the relevant evidence rule—under article I, section 7.
A.

Patton Required that Concerns for Either Officer Safety or the
Preservation of Crime-Relevant Evidence Exist at the Time of the
Search

In Patton, deputies observed a suspect with an outstanding felony
arrest warrant rummaging around in his vehicle and arrested him after he
fled the vehicle for a nearby trailer.179 The deputies secured him in a
patrol car and searched his vehicle, where they located
methamphetamine.180 The trial court “conclud[ed] that the search was
not incident to arrest because Patton was not arrested until he was taken
into physical custody in the trailer,” and the court of appeals agreed.181
The Washington State Supreme Court granted review in order to
determine “whether the search incident to arrest exception [to article I,
section 7] applie[d] in these circumstances.”182

174. Patton and Valdez are the only such decisions at the time of publication. The Washington
State Supreme Court did, however, hold oral argument in State v. Adams regarding warrantless
vehicle searches incident to arrest in early 2010. Video Recording of Oral Arguments, State v.
Adams, No. 82210-7 (Wash. argued Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?
evid=2010020008A&TYPE=V&CFID=6066626&CFTOKEN=68122957&bhcp=1.
175. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009).
176. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
177. 167 Wash. 2d at 394–95, 291 P.3d at 658.
178. 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759.
179. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 384, 219 P.3d at 653.
180. Id. at 385, 219 P.3d at 653.
181. Id., 219 P.3d at 653 (emphasis added).
182. Id.
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The Court determined that it did not.183 Citing Ringer, Stroud, and
subsequent cases interpreting Stroud,184 the Court determined that the
bright-line rule contained in Stroud referred only to the scope of a search
incident to arrest; it did not define the preconditions that would
authorize such a search.185 With respect to those preconditions, the Court
provided:
[T]he search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent
occupant is unlawful absent a reasonable basis to believe that the
arrestee poses a safety risk or that the vehicle contains evidence
of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or destroyed, and
that these concerns exist at the time of the search.186
The Court did not, however, explain the extent to which its decision was
influenced by Gant.187 Indeed, Gant was decided after the Patton Court
had already concluded oral argument.188 Without requesting any
additional briefing on Gant, and without holding any additional oral
argument,189 the Washington State Supreme Court in Patton simply
asserted via footnote that its decision was “consistent with . . . Gant.”190

183. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658 (“Under a proper understanding of the search incident to arrest
exception, the circumstances here simply do not involve a search incident to arrest.”).
184. Id. at 392–94, 219 P.3d at 656–57.
185. Id. at 393, 219 P.3d at 657 (identifying Stroud and its progeny as creating a “bright line rule
as to the scope of the area that may be searched”).
186. Id. at 394–95, 219 P.3d at 658.
187. The Patton Court referred to Gant as “a necessary course correction” for the broad
application of Chimel that proliferated in the wake of Belton, id. at 394, 219 P.3d at 658, but
maintained that its holding represented an interpretation of article I, section 7, id. at 385 n.3, 219
P.3d at 653 n.3. Concurring, Justice James Johnson found the majority’s claim unconvincing and
unnecessary: “[Gant] has decided this case for us, while this court was agonizing for a year over the
analysis. . . . Since the relevant facts are identical, the [Gant] holding must be applied . . . . The
majority engages in extensive dicta [regarding article I, section 7] unnecessary to the decision to
suppress the evidence . . . .” Id. at 396–97, 219 P.3d at 659 (Johnson, J., concurring).
188. The record indicates that oral argument for Patton concluded on May 29, 2008. See
Washington Courts, Appellate Court Case Summary for Case Number 805181,
http://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.casesummary&casenumber=805181%20%20%20&
searchtype=aName&crt_itl_nu=A08&filingDate=2007-08-21 [hereinafter Appellate Court Case
Summary] (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). This was nearly a year before Gant was decided on April 21,
2009.
189. The record contains no indication of additional briefing or oral argument on the Gant issue.
Appellate Court Case Summary, supra note 188.
190. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 396 n.9, 219 P.3d at 658 n.9.
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Valdez Independently Required that Concerns for Officer Safety or
the Perseveration of Crime-Relevant Evidence Exist at the Time of
the Search

The Washington State Supreme Court again addressed the post-Gant
future of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in Valdez,
but this time the Court did analyze the exception in the context of
Gant.191 The Court addressed the question of “whether an automobile
search incident to arrest, where the arrestee was handcuffed and secured
prior to the search of the automobile, was constitutional under article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and/or the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”192 In Valdez, an officer
pulled over a suspect for a traffic violation and discovered an
outstanding warrant for his arrest.193 The officer arrested and secured the
suspect in a patrol car, searched the suspect’s vehicle and noticed loose
panels.194 He called in a canine unit, which discovered
methamphetamine.195
Applying Gant, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arrestee was secured
at the time of the search, and the State had not shown that it was
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of the arrest might
be found in the vehicle.196 Without citing any authority, but applying a
rule similar to the one announced in Patton,197 the Court held that the
search violated article I, section 7 because it “was not necessary to
remove any weapons the arrestee could use to resist arrest or effect an
escape, or to secure any evidence of the crime of the arrest that could be
concealed or destroyed.”198 The Court thus rejected the search under
both the Fourth Amendment Gant rules and article I, section 7. The
Court did not, however, discuss whether the second Gant rule—the
relevant evidence rule—applied under article I, section 7.

191. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 768, 224 P.3d 751, 754 (2009) (“Due to a recent opinion of the United
States Supreme Court [in Gant], we are required to consider the previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and this court in light of that decision.” (citations omitted)).
192. Id. at 765, 224 P.3d at 753 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 766, 224 P.3d at 753.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 778, 224 P.3d at 759.
197. Interestingly, the majority in Valdez did not cite Patton once in its entire opinion.
198. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 778, 224 P.3d at 760.
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Patton and Valdez Adopt a Standard Similar to Gant’s Clarified
Chimel-Belton Rule, but Neither Accepts nor Rejects the Relevant
Evidence Rule

Because Patton and Valdez both premise the search of a vehicle
incident to arrest upon concerns for officer safety or the preservation of
evidence,199 both cases adopt a standard similar to Gant’s clarified
Chimel-Belton rule. Patton requires that an officer possess “a reasonable
basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk or that the vehicle
contains evidence of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or
destroyed,” and that “these concerns exist at the time of the search.”200
The Chimel-Belton rule is based on the same two justifications:
protecting officer safety and preserving evidence.201 As clarified by
Gant, this rule further requires that the concerns exist “at the time of the
search.”202 The Patton holding mirrors this reasoning precisely.203
Valdez, which considered Gant more extensively than did Patton, also
expresses a rule that requires concerns for officer safety or the
preservation of evidence,204 and further demonstrates that Washington
has adopted a rule similar to the Chimel-Belton rule. While the majority
in Valdez makes no reference to Patton, Valdez nevertheless presents a
nearly identical version of the first Gant prong.205
The Court’s analysis in Valdez begins with noting that Gant binds the
Court to consider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in redefining the
permissible preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest
under article I, section 7.206 After tracing the development of the ChimelBelton rule and discussing the history of its Washington analog,207 the
Court concluded:

199. State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 394–95, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d
at 778, 224 P.3d at 759.
200. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
201. See supra Part I.A.
202. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
203. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
204. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759.
205. Note that whereas Valdez discussed both Gant prongs under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court did not state whether the second Gant prong exception (the relevant evidence rule) applied
under article I, section 7. See id. at 768–71, 224 P.3d at 754–56.
206. Id. at 768, 224 P.3d at 754.
207. Id. at 768–71, 224 P.3d at 754–56 (Fourth Amendment analysis); id. at 771–77, 224 P.3d at
756–59 (article I, section 7 analysis).
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[A]fter an arrestee is secured and removed from the automobile,
he or she poses no risk of obtaining a weapon or concealing or
destroying evidence of the crime of arrest located in the
automobile, and thus the arrestee’s presence does not justify a
warrantless search under the search incident to arrest
exception.208
As in Patton, this reasoning closely resembles Gant’s clarified
Chimel-Belton rule: if the arrestee has been secured away from the
vehicle, the concerns of the Chimel-Belton rule are not implicated and do
not authorize a search of the vehicle incident to arrest.
While both Patton and Valdez consider Gant—to different degrees—
neither case explicitly accepts or rejects the relevant evidence rule.209
The Patton Court merely stated via footnote that its decision was
consistent with Gant, but did not indicate whether the relevant evidence
rule was permissible under article I, section 7.210 The Valdez Court
treated Gant more extensively than Patton, but, like Patton, did not
announce the relevant evidence rule’s permissibility.211 The Court noted
that it requested additional briefing on Gant,212 and discussed the
application of the relevant evidence rule213 under the Fourth
Amendment,214 but did not declare whether that rule applied under
article I, section 7.
IV. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
ADOPT A MODIFIED RELEVANT EVIDENCE RULE
If and when the Washington State Supreme Court considers a case
that squarely implicates the relevant evidence rule, it should adopt a
relevant evidence rule modified in scope to reflect the heightened
privacy requirement of article I, section 7. Such an approach would best
satisfy Gant and preserve the purpose of that provision because
208. Id. at 775–76, 224 P.3d at 759 (overruling State v. Stroud to the extent it is inconsistent with
the Valdez opinion).
209. One possible explanation for this omission is that neither Valdez nor Patton presented the
Court with facts squarely implicating the relevant evidence rule. In both cases, the Court considered
arrests due to outstanding warrants, stemming from offenses that did not present a reasonable basis
to believe that relevant evidence might be found in the vehicles. See State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d
379, 395, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 778, 224 P.3d at 759.
210. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 396 n.9, 219 P.3d at 658 n.9.
211. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 768–71, 778, 224 P.3d at 754–56, 759–60.
212. Id. at 768 n.2, 224 P.3d at 754 n.2.
213. The Court did not use this term in referring to the rule in Valdez.
214. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 771, 778, 224 P.3d at 756, 759.
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Washington historical case law supports a search based on the
preconditions for the relevant evidence rule, and the Washington State
Supreme Court has already defined the permissible scope of the search
of a vehicle incident to arrest.
A.

Patton and Valdez Support the Adoption of a Rule That Embraces
the Relevant Evidence Rule’s Preconditions

The Washington State Supreme Court in both Patton and Valdez did
not explicitly reject or adopt Gant’s relevant evidence rule, but the Court
did give analytic weight to the relevancy of evidence sought during the
search, suggesting that such relevance does figure into an analysis of
vehicle searches incident to arrest under article I, section 7 of the state
constitution. Additionally, Valdez suggests that something other than an
arrestee’s presence at the scene of the search may act as a justification
for the search—further supporting the notion that relevancy matters.
1.

Both Patton and Valdez give Analytic Weight to the Relevance of
the Evidence Sought

It is significant that, since Gant, the Court has reintroduced a relevant
evidence requirement via Patton and Valdez. In finding the search in
Patton invalid under article I, section 7, the Court noted that “[n]o
connection existed between [the arrestee], the reason for his arrest
warrant, and the [search of the] vehicle.”215 Because the arrestee’s
outstanding warrant was for an unrelated past offense, “there was no
basis to believe evidence relating to [his] arrest would have been found
in the car.”216 This language bears a strong resemblance to the relevant
evidence rule, which allows an officer to search a vehicle incident to
arrest “when it is ‘reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle.’”217
Valdez also gives analytic weight to the relevance of the evidence
sought to the crime of arrest.218 Specifically, the Court pronounced that a
search incident to arrest is invalid when there is no showing of concern
for officer safety, or that “evidence related to the crime of arrest [may
be] concealed or destroyed.”219 In other words, if a search incident to
215. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
216. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
217. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct 1710, 1719 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
218. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 779, 224 P.3d at 760.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
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arrest under Valdez is to be justified on the basis of preventing the
concealment or destruction of evidence, that evidence must be relevant
to the crime of arrest.
Admittedly, the inclusion of a relevant evidence requirement in both
Patton and Valdez does not conclusively demonstrate, on its own, the
permissibility of a rule that would allow vehicle searches incident to
arrest for relevant evidence in the absence of Chimel-Belton-like
concerns.220 It is possible that the Washington State Supreme Court has
simply crafted a hybrid rule from Gant, one that preserves the exigencies
of the Chimel-Belton standard, combined with the relevancy requirement
of the relevant evidence rule.221 However, given that neither Patton nor
Valdez explicitly discussed the issue one way or the other, the exact
implications of Patton’s and Valdez’s relevancy requirement are not
immediately clear. Consequently, the permissibility of the relevant
evidence rule under article I, section 7 remains an open question.
2.

Valdez Suggests Something Other Than an Arrestee’s Mere
Presence at the Scene of a Search Might Justify a Search Incident
to Arrest

Valdez suggests that something other than an arrestee’s mere
presence—and the entailed concerns for officer safety or the destruction
or concealment of evidence—might justify a search.222 Valdez states that
once an arrestee has been secured, and in accordance with the ChimelBelton rule contained in Gant, the arrestee’s presence no longer justifies
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.223 However, Valdez also
provides that even where the circumstances of the search do not
implicate the concerns of officer safety or the preservation of evidence, a
warrantless search may still be tolerated if it “fall[s] under another
220. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton and noting that
the rule contained therein does not follow from Chimel).
221. It is further possible that the Washington State Supreme Court drew upon prior Washington
decisions, rather than Gant, in reintroducing a relevant evidence requirement, although the timing of
Patton and Valdez suggests otherwise. Such a requirement is found in Washington cases from the
1960s. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 242–43, 427 P.2d 705, 707 (1967) (requiring
that a search incident to arrest be for evidence of the crime of arrest); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash.
2d 638, 644, 374 P.2d 989, 992 (1962) (same). These cases provide a potential alternative basis for
the Court’s reasoning, although they were overruled “to a greater or lesser degree” by State v.
Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 720 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983), overruled by State v. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d 144, 151, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777,
224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009).
222. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759.
223. Id.
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applicable exception.”224 Whether the Court, by this statement, intended
to allude to the possibility of an alternative justification for the search of
a vehicle incident to arrest—or another type of warrantless search
altogether—is unclear.225 However, the statement leaves room for the
argument that the relevance of the evidence sought, in accordance with
the rationale of the relevant evidence rule, might serve as such an
alternative justification.
B.

A Modified Relevant Evidence Rule Is Consistent with Article I,
Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution

The Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a version of the
relevant evidence rule modified to include a proscription on the opening
of locked containers. Such an approach would be consistent with article
I, section 7 because Washington common law possesses a history of
such searches, analogous to the alternative line of common law relied
upon by Gant and Thornton, and because the Washington State Supreme
Court has already defined the heightened privacy protections required by
article I, section 7 with respect to vehicle searches.
1.

Washington Historically Allowed the Search of a Vehicle Incident
to Arrest for Relevant Evidence Irrespective of the Arrestee’s
Location

Like the alternative line of Fourth Amendment cases relied upon by
Justice Scalia in Thornton and the United States Supreme Court in Gant,
Washington possesses a line of cases under article I, section 7 that
supports the permissibility of the relevant evidence rule.226 Historically,
searches incident to arrest conducted after an arrestee has been secured
and removed from the site of a search have been allowed under article I,

224. Id.
225. The Washington State Supreme Court has also recognized the warrantless search of a
vehicle when, for example, the officers are presented with certain exigent circumstances. These
circumstances may include hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, danger to an arresting officer or the public,
mobility of a vehicle, and mobility or destruction of evidence. State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 60,
659 P.2d 1087, 1089–90 (1983). Although they share some commonalities, “the search incident to
arrest exception should be distinguished from the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 386 n.5, 219 P.3d 651, 654 n.5 (2009). The
Washington State Court of Appeals also recently upheld the search of a vehicle incident to arrest
based upon presumptively valid interpretations of constitutional law later declared unconstitutional
by Gant. State v. Riley, No. 62418-1, 2010 WL 427118, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2010).
226. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text.
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section 7.227 Cases decided between 1929 and 1962 allowed searches
incident to the arrest of a non-present arrestee—either because the Court
paid no heed to the arrestee’s presence, or because it relaxed the physical
proximity requirement so far as to render it effectively nominal.228
More recently, the Washington State Supreme Court has spoken
emphatically against such searches,229 but never in a way that
undermines the justifications for the relevant evidence rule. In Patton,
for example, the Court noted that while it had previously “upheld
searches incident to arrest conducted after the arrestee has been
secured,”230 it would now “expressly disapprove of this expansive
application of the narrow search incident to arrest exception.”231 But in
doing so, the Court relied on the Chimel-Belton-like reasoning contained
in Ringer, requiring concerns for officer safety or the destruction of
evidence.232 Valdez similarly relied heavily on Ringer, from a ChimelBelton-like standpoint.233 Neither of these cases directly addressed the
alternative reasoning that justifies the relevant evidence rule, a rule that
depends simply on the relevance of the evidence sought and does not
implicate the officer safety or destruction of evidence concerns that
underlie the Chimel-Belton rule.234 The Washington State Supreme
Court’s disapproval of these cases in the Ringer/Chimel-Belton context
does not therefore necessitate a disapproval of the searches they contain
in the relevant evidence rule context.

227. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686,
696, 720 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983) (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court previously
allowed searches incident to arrest after the suspect had been secured away from the place of arrest
at the time of the search), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720
P.2d 436 (1986).
228. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 774–77, 224 P.3d 751, 757–59 (2009); State v.
Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 395, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 720 P.2d at
1247.
230. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
231. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658.
232. Id. at 389, 219 P.3d at 655 (citing Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699–700, 674 P.2d at 1248)).
233. See Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 774, 224 P.3d at 758 (citing Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 674
P.2d at 1247–48, for the proposition that prior Washington cases departed from the principles upon
which the search incident to arrest exception was based).
234. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (providing that an officer
may search a vehicle incident to arrest for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, “[a]lthough it
does not follow from Chimel”).
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Modifications to the Scope of the Relevant Evidence Rule Would
Satisfy Article I, Section 7’s Heightened Privacy Protections

While the Washington State Supreme Court has long held that article
I, section 7 protects greater privacy interests in vehicles than does the
Fourth Amendment,235 these interests are not without definition, and the
relevant evidence rule may be modified accordingly. In Stroud, the
Washington State Supreme Court defined the additional protections
required by article I, section 7 by adopting a standard nearly identical to
the Fourth Amendment, with the added requirement that an officer not
open a locked glove box or any locked containers found during the
search of a vehicle incident to arrest without first obtaining a warrant.236
While the bright-line rule contained in Stroud has since been
disapproved as a precondition to a search incident to arrest,237 the
Washington State Supreme Court has never declared the formula for
offering greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, articulated in
Stroud, to be defunct. In this sense, the Stroud Court’s formula for
modifying a Fourth Amendment standard into something permissible
under article I, section 7 should still be considered good law; thus, a
modified version of the relevant evidence rule, including a proscription
on the opening of any locked containers or a locked glove box, would be
consistent with article I, section 7.238
CONCLUSION
Following a turbulent history of complex interplay between
Washington and federal law, the search of a vehicle incident to arrest
exception under article I, section 7 continues to occupy a state of

235. See State v. Bello, 142 Wash. App. 930, 936, 176 P.3d 554, 558 (2008) (“[A]rticle 1, section
7 provides greater protection of the privacy interest in a vehicle and its contents than does the
Fourth Amendment.”).
236. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986); see also supra Part II.D.
237. See Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 394, 219 P.3d at 657 (“We cannot presume that every time a car
is present at the scene of an arrest, a search of the car falls within the scope of Stroud’s bright line
rule.” (emphasis added)); see also Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759 (overturning
Stroud’s bright-line rule with respect to the scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest).
238. The Washington State Supreme Court has also provided that, pursuant to the heightened
privacy protections of article I, section 7, a valid search incident to arrest may not extend to the
search of items belonging to a vehicle’s nonarrested passenger, unless the state has made a showing
of “the existence of any articulable, objective suspicion that [the] nonarrested passenger was armed
or dangerous or had secreted contraband obtained from the arrestee.” State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d
486, 504, 987 P.2d 73, 84 (1999). Such a further limitation of scope may also be considered in
adopting the relevant evidence rule under article I, section 7.
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regrettable uncertainty. The United States Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Gant reinterpreted the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the
Fourth Amendment and threw Washington law into disarray. The
resultant confusion is attributable both to the unsteady history of
Washington jurisprudence concerning the search of a vehicle incident to
arrest and Washington’s long-held maxim that article I, section 7
provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment.
While the Washington State Supreme Court adopted Gant’s
articulation of the federal Chimel-Belton standard in Patton and Valdez,
requiring concern for officer safety or the preservation of evidence in
order to conduct the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, it remains to
be seen whether Washington will adopt the second standard contained in
Gant—the relevant evidence rule. Unrelated to Chimel-Belton, the
relevant evidence rule authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to
arrest when it is reasonable to believe that it contains evidence relevant
to the crime of the arrest—irrespective of the location of the arrestee at
the time of the search. Such a search finds support in alternative lines of
both Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 jurisprudence.
The Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a modified
relevant evidence rule containing an added proscription on the opening
of locked containers, because the concerns that led the Gant Court to
adopt the logic of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton apply
equally in Washington; because Washington common law also possesses
a history of searches for relevant evidence; and because the Washington
State Supreme Court has already defined the heightened protections
required by article I, section 7 in the search of a vehicle incident to arrest
context. Thus, a modified relevant evidence rule would be wholly
consistent with article I, section 7.

